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APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES AND CONTRIBUTION
AMONG COCONSPIRATORS IN ANTITRUST TREBLE
DAMAGE ACTIONS
PETER G. CORBETT
I. INTRODUCTIONT HE title of this article may be misleading because it implies that law
exists on the subject, whereas to the writer's knowledge, at least with
respect to the question of contribution, there is not a single decision in
point. It seems appropriate, therefore, to consider what are, or rather
what would be, the rights and liabilities among several defendants who
are found liable for treble damages in an antitrust conspiracy action, both
inter se and against coconspirators who have not been joined. While
undoubtedly most treble damage codefendants settle their respective
obligations among themselves, which may explain the dearth of authority,
it is conceivable in this era of increasing antitrust activity that a defend-
ant faced with liability for an entire treble damage judgment may wonder
what are his rights by way of apportionment of damages or contribution
from his codefendants and coconspirators.
The arguments that have been raised from time to time against the
desirability of contribution in the tort field generally, whether sound or
not, do not necessarily have validity in the antitrust context. For exam-
ple, objections have been made that contribution unnecessarily compli-
cates the plaintiff's litigation and makes for an inequitable distribution
of damages where some cotort-feasors are insured and others are not.'
Since it is common practice for an antitrust plaintiff to join as many
defendants as may reasonably be expected to be liable, with a view to
ensuring full recovery, it is difficult to see how his burden would be
increased by permitting contribution. On the contrary, the existence of
this right should be an additional incentive, at least to smaller corporate
defendants, to settle with a plaintiff in return for an agreement not to
sue.2 In any event, simplicity of litigation is not an end in itself, and if
1. See 1 Harper & James, Torts 717 (1956); James, Contribution Among Joint Tort-
feasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1156 (1941), contending that there Eboul
be no right of contribution on the part of the insured tort-feasor. For the opposing dewpint,
see Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tort-Feasors: A Defense, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1170
(1941). See also James, Replication, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1173 (1941); Gregory, Rejoinder, 54
Harv. L. Rev. 1134 (1941).
2. A release of one joint tort-feasor for good consideration would, of course, rease all.
See Rector v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Cal. 1952). A plaintiff
could, therefore, hardly be expected to give a release in return for settlement with one of the
parties, and it would be unlikey that the latter would be satifid with anything leHs. How-
ever, both plaintiff and settling defendants have been protected where a convenant not to sue,
111
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
justice is better served by an equitable rule of division of damages, the
possibility of some increment in complexity should not be permitted to
stand in the way. Furthermore, insurance, as a practical matter, and
probably as a matter of public policy, plays no part in antitrust liability.
While corporate size and resources must often be greatly disparate, they
would seldom be as acute a problem of ability to pay as in the case of
insured and uninsured individual tort-feators.
It is the purpose of this article to show that, as a matter of both law
and sound antitrust policy, contribution among coconspirators in treble
-damage actions should be allowed whether or not the coconspirators are
joined in the action.
While the rule against contribution, at least where the parties are in
pari delicto, is generally claimed to be a fundamental principle of the
common law (based either on the public policy that no one should
profit through his own wrong or on the premise that the judiciary is not
equipped to fashion rules of contribution) 3, it is neither sound in terms
of the precedent on which it is alleged to be based, nor does it prevail in
the majority of common-law jurisdictions.
The leading case of Merryweather v. Nixan4 involved deliberate and
intentional tortious acts, and the rule against contribution which it
established was so confined by both the English5 and early American
cases. Accordingly, it does not support the absolute denial of contribu-
tion among joint tort-feasors for which it is generally cited in those
American jurisdictions which have not limited the rule in accordance
with the original Merryweather rationale. 7
which is not in settlement of the full amount of the plaintiff's damages, is executed. Such an
agreement, it has been held, falls short of a release. See Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d
368, 397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
3. The concept of contribution would not appear to conflict with the maxim (that no
one should profit by his own wrong) since it would afford defendants not a positive gain
but merely a mitigation of loss. It would seem, furthermore, that public policy Is better
served by an equitable division of damages than by permitting wrongdoers to escape
liability on what must be a fairly frequent basis. After all, the purpose of an award of
damages, with rare exceptions, is to compensate the injured plaintiff, not to punish his
transgressors.
4. 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
5. See, e.g., Palmer v. Wick & Pulteneytown Steam Shipping Co., [1894] A.C. 318
(Scot.); Betts v. Gibbins, 2 Ad. & E. 57, 111 Eng. Rep. 22 (K.B. 1834); Adamson v. Jarvis,
4 Bing. 66, 130 Eng. Rep. 693 (C.P. 1827).
6. See Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455 (1859); Hunt v. Lane, 9 Ind. 248 (1857);
Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 203 (1853); Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66
Pa. 218 (1870). See also Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for
Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 176, 180-82 (1898).
7. For examples of denial of contribution in personal negligence cases, see Adams v.
White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 195 Pac. 389 (1921); Wise v. Berger, 103 Conn. 29, 130
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Despite this misinterpretation, however, six and possibly seven states
and the District of Columbia retained the original common-law rule of
judicial contribution, limiting it to those torts which do not involve in-
tentional misconduct.3 In addition, twenty-three states now have legis-
lation permitting contribution in varying circumstances. Of these, only
one expressly denies contribution in the case of certain intentional torts,"
while six others limit the right to joint-judgment defendants.' The
remainder, eight of which have adopted, in whole or in part, the tTni-
form Contribution Among Joint Tort-Feasors Act, permit contribution
in the broadest sense," as do both England and the Canadian provinces.12
Atl. 76 (1925); Royal Indem. Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194 (1930). Federal
courts have also recognized the rule in diversity cases. Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago,
B. & Q. R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905).
S. Louisiana, Linkenhoger v. Owens, 181 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1950) (only in judgment in
solido cases); Minnesota, Duluth, Ml. & N. Ry. v. McCarthy, 183 Mlin. 414, 236 N.W. 766
(1931); Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn. 35M, 203 N.V. 13 (1926); Oregon,
Furbeck v. . Gevurtz & Son, 72 Ore. 12, 143 Pac. 654 (1914) (overruled on other grounds) ;
Pennsylvania, Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 Atl. 231 (1923); Tevnezcse,
Davis v. Broad St. Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950) (active-passive negligence
distinction); Wisconsin, Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis. 591, 195 N.W. 355 (1923); Ditrict of
Columbia, Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Maine has also indicatcd
recognition of a limited right, Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 Afl. 815 (1913).
9. North Dakota, N.D. Cent. Code § 32-33-01 (1960). The statute is based on the
revised Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, which denies the right in cases of
intentional torts.
10. Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.561 (1943); MissLssippi, Mliss. Code Ann. § 335-5
(1956); Missouri, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.060 (1953); New York, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 211-a;
Texas, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2212 (1950); West Virginia, %. Va. Code Ann. § 5432
(1961).
11. Those states having statutes based on the 1939 uniform act are: Armnsas, Ark.
Stat. Ann. §§ 34-1C01 to -1009 (Supp. 1961); Delaware, Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 6301-03
(1953); Hawaii, Hawaii Rev. Laws §§ 246-10 to -16 (1955); Maryland, Md. Ann. Code art.
50, §§ 16-24 (1957); New Mlenico, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-1-11 to -1S (1953); Pennsylvania, Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 20S2-S9 (Supp. 1961); Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 10-6-1 to
-11 (1956) (Supp. 1961); South Dakota, S.D. Code §§ 33.04A01 to -10 (Supp. 1960). North
Dakota, as noted supra note 9, has adopted the revised act of 1955, which also eliminated the
optional provision in the 1939 act for distribution of damages according to degree of fault. The
remaining states, which recognize the right of contribution are: Georgia, Ga. Code § 105
(1938); Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 412.030 (1955); Louisiana, La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2103
(Supp. 1961); New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-1 (1952); North Carolina, N.C. Gen.
StaL § 1-240 (1953); Virginia, Va. Code Ann. § 3-627 (1957) (limited to negligence);
Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 113.01 to 10 (1957).
12. England, Law Reform (Mlarried Women and Tort-feasors) Act1 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5,
c. 30, § 6; e.g., Alberta, Tort-Feasors Act, Alberta Rev. Stat. c. 143 (1942); British Columbia,
Contributory Negligence Act, British Columbia Rev. Stat. c. 52 (1936); Manitoba,
Tortfeasors and Contributory Negligence Act, Manitoba Rev. Stat. c. 215 (1940); Ontario,
Negligence Act, Ontario Rev. Stat. c. 115 (1937).
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II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Nature of the Liability of Participants in Illegal Combinations
Determination of the nature of the cause of action for treble damages
given by Section 4 of the Clayton Act'3 is fundamental to the question of
the relative liability of the defendants, and, therefore, to that of contribu-
tion.' 4 It appears to have been settled conclusively that a treble damage
action under section 4 is one in tort, whether it be for violation of the
Sherman Act 5 or of the Clayton Act.'" For example, referring to a treble
damage action arising out of an illegal conspiracy to enhance prices, a
United States circuit court'7 spoke in terms of an "unlawful and tortious"
agreement between the defendants, and of the "torts committed in the
course of the illegal combination.""' In affirming, the Supreme Court
described the purchases made by the plaintiff at prices enhanced
pursuant to the conspiracy as contracts "springing from a tort," 10 and
this characterization has been confirmed beyond question.20
The cases which have held treble damage suits for violations of the
Sherman Act to be actions in tort have made it clear that coconspirators
or participants in an illegal combination which injures a plaintiff in his
business or property are joint tort-feasors and may be sued as such.21
13. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
14. It may also be significant with regard to the immediate outcome of an action. It
is interesting to note that Massachusetts courts, for example, do not appear to follow the
common-law rule that judgment in a tort action may be rendered against one or more of
several defendants, but apply the broader common-law rule, from which tort actions are
generally excepted, that, in the absence of statutory modification, if several defendants are
joined in an action, recovery must be for or against all or none, at least where the liability
asserted is joint. Statutory modification does exist in Massachusetts for actions in contract,
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 235, § 6 (1956), but not in tort. See Contakis v. Flavio, 221 Mass. 259,
108 N.E. 1045 (1915) which was an action against joint tort-feasors, where the court noted
that the statute did not apply to tort actions. Whether this would follow in a treble damage
action under a federal statute depends upon the court's determination of the applicable
law.
15. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
16. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-1961);
see Sidney Morris & Co. v. National Ass'n of Stationers, 40 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1930).
17. City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks, 127 Fed. 23 (6th Cir. 1903),
aff'd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
18. Id. at 26.
19. 203 U.S. at 397.
20. See Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 583 (8th Cir. 1945);
Farmers Co-operative Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 43 F. Supp. 735, 738 (NDl. Iowa),
modified on other grounds, 133 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1942); Imperial Film Exch. v. Gen-
eral Film Co., 244 Fed. 985, 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
21. See Rector v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Cal. 1952), "It is
the Court's opinion that actions such as this are actions in tort and the rule that the
release for consideration of one joint tort-feasor releases all joint feasors is applicable." Id.
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In Sidney Morris & Co. v. National Ass'n of Stationcrs,-2 the plaintiff
brought an action for treble damages against 104 defendants, alleging a
conspiracy to damage the plaintiff in its business through unlawful
discrimination in price. Although the action was essentially one for
violation of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act,2 the analysis
of the nature of conspiracy and joint liability contained in the opinion is
pertinent here. The defendants contended that the gist of the action was
conspiracy, and that since the cause of action was for alleged violation of
the Clayton Act, the suit should be dismissed because the Clayton Act
is not a conspiracy statute. The court, however, pointed out that:
An action may lie for damages suffered by reason of torts committed pursuant
to a conspiracy but no action for damages lies for the conspiracy alone.... The
gist of such action is not, as appellees assert, the conspiracy, but it is the damages
for which the wrongdoer and all who conspire with him are liable.-4
The court went on to hold that the complaint did not improperly join a
statutory cause of action with one based on the common law, but that
there was only one cause of action
for damages, the recovery of which is authorized by [Section 4 of the Clayton Act]
... for acts condemned by [Section 2 of the Clayton Act] ... directed against the
wrongdoers and their agents and their partners who joined the tort-feasors in
committing the wrong upon appellant.25
In other words, it was the conspiracy that enabled the plaintiff to join
104 defendants in one action for individual acts of price discrimination.
The court concluded:
Obviously A, who has a good cause of action against B for acts committed in violation
of [Section 2 of the Clayton Act] . . . cannot join similar but separate causes of
action against C and make B and C defendants in the one action. It is only by
virtue of C's adopting B's acts and by B's adopting C's acts (through their agreement,
combination or conspiracy) that appellant may hold B and C jointly and severally
for the acts of each.26
It also appears to be well established that the stage at which a
participant joins a conspiracy does not determine or limit the extent of
his liability. Where different parties join successively in a single con-
tinuing conspiracy by which a competitor is injured, all those joining in
at 264. See also Fllntkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 36S (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 US. 03S
(1957) ; Webster Iotor Car Co. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 234 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1956) ; Solar
Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 156 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
22. 40 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1930).
23. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)(b), 21(a) (195S) (Supp. III,
1959-1961).
24. 40 F.2d at 624.
25. Ibid.
26. Id. at 625.
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the unlawful act at different times become liable for whatever injury
results from the combination in which they participate. 27
Finally, it has been held that, given a conspiracy which results in
injury to the plaintiff, it makes no difference that parties shown to have
participated in the illegal agreement did not actually join in the acts
causing the injury. Thus, in City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry
& Pipeworks,28 plaintiff-city brought a treble damage action against
three of the companies which had previously been enjoined, in a suit by
the Government,2" from combining and conspiring to restrain trade in
the manufacture and sale of cast-iron pipe. The combination, it was
ultimately proved, had established a system of bidding under which the
city had been compelled to pay exorbitant prices for the pipe it had
purchased. Actually, the plaintiff had purchased the pipe in question
exclusively from the Anniston Pipe & Foundry Company, one of the six
defendants in the Government's action.30 For some unexplained reason,
Anniston was not joined in the treble damage action, but this was held to
have no bearing on the liability of the defendants sued:
That its purchases were made exclusively from the Anniston Pipe Company, a
corporation doing business in Alabama, and that it is not suing that corporation, is of
no vital significance .... The direct intention and effect of the combination was to
limit and restrict the right of each of the several companies to compete for business
with Atlanta, as well as to enhance the price of the commodity which was the subject
of the agreement.
We have, then, a direct action by this plaintiff against two of the members of this
unlawful combine. That there was no purchase made direct from either of them is
of no importance. Their guilt is as great as that of the Alabama corporation from
whom the plaintiff did buy its pipe. If the agreement between the defendants and their
associates was unlawful and tortious, each is responsible for the torts committed in
the course of the illegal combination. These defendants have themselves participated
in the benefits resulting from the bonus paid by the Alabama member of the associa-
tion, and have no ground to complain that they have been alone sued.8 '
If a continuing conspiracy on the part of all or some of the defendants
in an action can be shown, therefore, such defendants, given the element
27. American Steel Co. v. American Steel & Wire Co., 244 Fed. 300 (D. Mass. 1916);
see Dextone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 60 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1932), where the court
accepted as clearly correct the contention that "every person who participates in a con-
spiracy is liable for everything done during the period of its existence regardless of the
exact time at which he becomes a member or the extent of his participation." Id. at 48.
Walder v. Paramount Publix Corp., 1955 Trade Cas. 11 70543 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The principle
seems to have been first authoritatively stated by the Supreme Court in Lincoln v. Claflin,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 132, 138 (1868).
28. 127 Fed. 23 (6th Cir. 1903).
29. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
30. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (1899).
31. 127 Fed. at 25-26.
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of damage, would be liable as joint tort-feasors, and neither lateness in
joining the combination nor limited extent of participation could be ad-
vanced as exonerating or mitigating factors. The conclusion appears in-
escapable that each defendant proved to have participated at some stage
in the conspiracy may be held liable for the entire amount of damage
caused, and that it would be irrelevant whether or not such defendant
had actually committed any overt illegal acts pursuant to the conspiracy.
B. Apportionment of Damages
In general, where the common-law rule is not modified by statute, an
assessment of damages in an action against joint tort-feasors must be for
a lump sum against those found liable, and cannot be severally ap-
portioned between them.- The applicability of this general principle
to antitrust treble damage actions might raise a complicated choice-of-
law question were it not for the fact that a circuit court of appeals has
already held squarely in favor of the common-law rule. Dextone Co. v.
Building Trades Council33 was a treble damage action involving a con-
spiracy in restraint of trade in 1923 by a group of New York stone-
cutters and joined two years later by a similar group in Westchester
County. The jury returned a verdict assessing the plaintiff's total
damages at $11,000, but finding the Westchester defendants liable for
only $2,000 of that amount, and the district court had trebled the sums
on that basis. The circuit court of appeals in reversing held that there
was no evidence of two distinct conspiracies, and that all defendants
should, therefore, have been held jointly and severally liable. 4 The court
stated:
The verdict therefore established the guilt of all the defendants and the total
damages they caused the plaintiff by their wrongful combination. Hence the jury's
attempt to apportion to the Westchester group only a part of the damages should have
been ignored as surplusage, and judgment should have becn entered for the full
amount against all the v.rongdoers-3
While the court did not specify what law it was applying, the case is
nonetheless authoritative.
C. Contribution Between Defendants
It is important at this point to distinguish between the often confused
concepts of contribution and indemnity.30 The majority of common-law
32. Watt v. Combs, 244 Ala. 31, 12 So. 2d 139 (1943); Miller v. Singer, 131 Colo. 112,
279 P.2d 846 (1955).
33. 60 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1932).
34. Id. at 49.
35. Ibid. See also Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents' Conference,
166 F. Supp. 163 (EDl. Pa. 195S), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
36. "Historically neither the common law courts nor the legislative bodies have been
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courts have not allowed contribution-the division of damages between
joint tort-feasors-whether on a pro rata or culpability basis. They
have, however, on occasion, permitted indemnity, shifting the entire loss
in order to fasten "the ultimate liability upon the one whose wrong has
been primarily responsible for the injury sustained. ' 37 In such cases the
"innocent" or slightly culpable wrongdoer has been allowed to recover
the full amount of the damages he has paid from the one primarily
responsible for the injury.38 The principle of indemnity has been
recognized by both state and federal courts.89 It applies, however, only in
cases where the parties are not in par delicto, and, hence, would not likely
serve to relieve antitrust coconspirators. °
sympathetic with the plight of wrongdoers in the adjustment of their affairs. . . . Such an
attitude is more understandable where the wrongs involve moral turpitude, as most torts
involved in the earlier cases did. In more recent times, since the development of rules Im-
posing liability for negligence, liability for the acts of others and even liability without
fault on the part of anyone, both courts and legislatures have intervened to shift the
burden of loss from one tortfeasor to another, either wholly or partially.
This has been done in three ways: (1) by requiring contribution by all tortfeasors ... ; (2)
by requiring one tortfeasor to pay the entire amount of damages assessed against another... ;
and (3) by dividing the liability among tortfeasors proportioned to their culpability. The
first and third methods have been employed only when expressly authorized by legislation;
the second method has been utilized by courts on their own initiative." Hodges, Contribu-
tion and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 Texas L. Rev. 150 (1947). The last statement,
however, regarding the necessity of modifying legislation is not completely accurate. See
note 8 supra and Prosser, Torts 246 (2d ed. 1955).
37. Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 196 U.S. 217, 227 (1905).
38. The rule is well expressed in Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co., 114 Mass. (18 Browne)
149 (1873), where the court held that a building owner had an action for indemnity against.
the gas light company, which by fastening wires to his chimney had caused it to weaken and
fall, injuring a passer-by. The court said that when two parties act together and cause
an injury for which they are equally culpable or participes criminis, there is no Indemnity or
right of contribution. This rule does not apply when one party causes the injury but
another is exposed to liability. In this case the parties are not in par delicto, and the
innocent party may recover from the wrongdoer. See also Boston Woven Hose & Rubber
Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N.E. 657 (1901), where the plaintiff was allowed to
recover indemnity on defendant's warranty even though he breached his duty of Inspection.
39. See Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 (1896); Boston
Woven Hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall, supra note 38; Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co., supra
note 38. While the collective rationale of these cases is somewhat unclear, and appears In
the last analysis to rest upon the dubious distinction between malfeasance and nonfeasance,
they do serve to mark the limits of that area in which the common-law courts have generally
felt free to shift responsibility as between joint tort-feasors. These cases represent the
general rule. However, it is not true to say that the courts have never fashioned rules of
contribution, as distinguished from indemnity. Note 8 supra; Prosser, Torts 246-48 (2d ed.
1955).
40. The contention that participation in the illegal agreement but not in the acts which
caused the damage should entitle a party to indemnity appears to be precluded by the
decision in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
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However, the issue of contribution in the antitrust context is not
necessarily concluded by the foregoing common-law rules. As noted
previously, twenty-three states have adopted statutory provisions allow-
ing contribution to a greater or lesser extent, "1 nine of these being based
on the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act:"1 Adding to these
the jurisdictions in which the right exists at common law,; 3 it is found
that contribution among joint tort-feasors, in one form or another, is now
in effect in more than half the states. There remains, therefore, the
question whether these statutes or, alternatively, the common-law rules
prevailing in those states which have not taken such legislative action,
should determine the extent of liability in an action created by federal
statute. If state law is inapplicable, there is the further question of what
rule to apply, if indeed any exists, in the context of federal law. And if
none exists, what bearing should the various state laws have upon the
framing of a rule by a federal court. The answers to these questions
depend initially upon the choice between state and federal law as
governing.
III. CHOICE OF LAW
A. Cases in Point
Before turning immediately to the choice of law issue, it would be ap-
propriate to consider what appear to be the only three cases which have
any significant bearing upon the ultimate individual liability of an
antitrust coconspirator in a treble damage action. Webster Motor Car
Co. v. Zell Motor Car Co.44 was an action brought in the district court
in Maryland for treble damages on account of an alleged conspiracy in
restraint of trade between the named defendants and the Packard Motor
Car Company which was not named. Prior to institution of this suit,
a similar action had been commenced in the District of Columbiall
against the same defendants and Packard, but was dismissed against all
but Packard for failure to obtain valid service. The Maryland action
was brought just prior to the expiration of the period of limitation under
the MIaryland statute, to keep the cause of action alive in the event that
plaintiffs failed to recover against Packard in the District of Columbia.
The defendants had made several motions in the Maryland action, and
plaintiffs obtained a continuance on the condition that, upon determina-
tion on the merits of the District of Columbia action, the Maryland
suit would be dismissed with prejudice. Packard sought to use this
41. See notes 9-11 supra, and Prosser, Torts 24S (2d ed. 1955).
42. See notes 9 & 11 supra.
43. See note 8 supra.
44. 234 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1956) (not reported in the district court).
45. Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 135 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1955).
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consent order as a release in its defense of the District of Columbia
action. The court there overruled the argument, found Packard a
coconspirator, and the case was appealed.4" The defendants in the
Maryland action claimed this was a determination on the merits by the
District of Columbia court, and sought an order of dismissal with
prejudice, which was granted. The circuit court in Maryland then,
reversed that order on the ground that in view of the manifest injustice
resulting, and the likelihood that the original continuance was intended
to extend to a final determination of the District of Columbia action, the
dismissal constituted an unsound exercise of discretion. The manifest
injustice was found by the court to arise as follows:
In this connection it should be remembered that Packard has been found by the
District of Columbia Court to be a co-conspirator with defendants, and that, under
Maryland law, defendants would be liable for contribution to Packard as joint
tort-feasors. . . . Assuming that the recovery in the District of Columbia Court
is sustained against other attacks, for Packard to be released from the liability
because of the order . . . [of continuance] or dismissal of defendants here pursuant
to that order would result in an outrageous miscarriage of justice, not contemplated
by the court or by the parties in the entry of the order.47
The language of the second sentence quoted above is markedly in-
consistent with that in the first. The clear implication of the first
sentence is that Packard would be put at a disadvantage by the dismissal
with prejudice of the Maryland action. However, the use of the phrase
"released from . . . liability" in the second sentence seems to intimate
that it is Packard that would be perpetrating the "outrageous miscarriage
of justice" if the Maryland action were to be so dismissed. It must be
assumed that the court still meant to conclude that the loss by Packard
of the right to contribution would have been unconscionable under the
circumstances; otherwise, the court's conclusion does not follow from its
premise. If this be the correct interpretation, it is clear that, since
Packard was not a defendant in the Maryland action, the court was of
the view that contribution would not be limited to joint-judgment defend-
ants. This is in accord with the provisions of the Maryland statute
which, being based on the 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
Feasors Act, expressly precludes joint judgment as a prerequisite to the
right of contribution.4 s Unfortunately for purposes of this discussion,
however, the District of Columbia decision was reversed on appeal,40
46. For a summary of the combined history of both actions including unreported de-
cisions, see 234 F.2d at 616-17.
47. Id. at 619.
48. Md. Ann. Code art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1957).
49. 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 82.2 (1957). This was the well-
known companion case to Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D.
Md. 1956), which the circuit court followed in finding no restraint of trade.
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thus exonerating Packard and extinguishing what might have been a case
of first impression on the question of antitrust contribution.
The second case is Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubrt," where the court
dismissed a third-party complaint against the third-party defendants
alleged to have participated in the conspiracy on which the plaintiff
sued. The plaintiff argued first that federal law would govern the
question of joinder and that, since federal law would deny a right of
contribution between joint tort-feasors, the attempted joinder was
improper. While tending to agree with this reasoning, the court never-
theless disposed of the case on the ground that there was no joint tort,
since the conspiracy allegedly participated in by the proposed third-party
defendants was separate from that on which the action was based. Ac-
cordingly, even under the Pennsylvania statute providing for contribu-
tion between joint tort-feasors,51 the defendants would not be entitled to
contribution from the third-party defendants. As the court stated:
Since both sets of claimed torts are declared in the complaints to be actionable
solely by reason of federal law there would seem to be strong justification for
appellee's contention that the tort asserted to lie in the third party complaint is
governed by federal common law with no right of contribution between tortfeasors.
In any event from the inescapable factual allegations, under the Pennsylvania Act
to provide for contribution among tortfeasors . .. which was in effect when the
alleged tort commenced, and its successor . .. [Uniform Contribution Among Joint
Tort-Feasors Act] there would be no contribution from the third party defendant
to the defendants. The former Section 2031 defines joint tort feasors "as those who
are jointly or severally liable for a tort where, as between them, such liabilities are
either all primary or all secondary." The current Section 2082 gives the definition
"two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to persons
or property. . . ." Here the alleged injury caused plaintiff by the defendants pre-
venting the [theatre] ... from presenting legitimate attractions, was not the
separate and distinct injury said to have been caused by the third party defendants'
refusal to permit plaintiff to show first run movies.02
The case is, accordingly, no more conclusive on the question than the
Zell case. On the contrary, it rather serves to emphasize just how incon-
clusive the law with respect to antitrust contribution remains. The court
in Goldlawr would apparently disagree with the court in Zdll on the
threshold question of whether or not federal law would apply to the issue
of contribution. Though the language cited above might be considered
somewhat authoritative as dicta, it cannot be regarded as a considered
statement of the law, particularly since the court gave no reasons for its
assumption that federal common law would deny contribution.
One other case which has at least limited pertinence here is Flintkote
50. 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960).
51. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 20S2-S9 (Supp. 1961).
52. 276 F.2d at 616-17.
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Co. v. Lysfjord,53 in which suit was originally instituted for treble
-damages against Flintkote and several other defendants as cocon-
spirators. At the trial it was brought out that $20,000 had been paid
to the plaintiffs in exchange for a covenant not to sue running in favor of
all defendants except Flintkote. A verdict was brought against Flint-
kote for $50,000 and was trebled by the court to a total of $150,000,
plus costs and attorney's fees, minus $20,000 already received by the
plaintiff in exchange for the covenant not to sue. Flintkote appealed
on several grounds, one being that there was error in the method of
crediting the $20,000 payment. Flintkote wanted that sum subtracted
from the jury verdict before the verdict was trebled so that the ultimate
damages would be $90,000 instead of $130,000. The court refused to
accept that argument, holding that the covenant was not intended to
constitute full compensation and did not, therefore, operate to release all
the joint tort-feasors. It went on to point out that, while this was a case
of first impression, its resolution lay in the application of firmly rooted
principles of joint liability in conjunction with the manifest objectives of
the treble damage provision. The court stated:
Flintkote, if a co-conspirator, would be jointly and severally liable under well-
settled principles of law for the entire amount if (1) the plaintiffs had successfully
prosecuted any or all of the other co-conspirators, or (2) no jurisdiction could be
acquired over the other alleged offenders and consequently only Flintkote was sued.
Accordingly, the settlement does not impose an additional burden on Flintkote, but
rather serves only to militate against its liability .... [S]atisfaction would not
be achieved by the award of any sum, which added to the settlement sum, did not
total $150,000. . . . In the case of punitive damages joint tortfeasors are liable for
the entire amount, not merely the compensatory part.
54
Unfortunately, again, the court did not go into the question of con-
tribution between defendants. The case is significant, however, in two
respects. The first is the emphasis placed by the court upon the nature
,of joint liability, and its added deterrent effect in the treble damage con-
text, which seems to militate against the possibility of a right of contri-
bution. Secondly, it is interesting to note that the court made no
reference to any particular body of law from which the "well-settled
principles" described might be drawn. There is certainly no allusion
to state law, and one can only assume that the court accepted these
principles as prevailing federal rules, irrespective of any modifications
imposed by the laws of a particular state or states.
In the face of this meager background of judicial consideration, to
which legal writers appear to have" made no supplementary contribution
53. 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1957).
54. Id. at 397-98.
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as yet,5 the question of the liability inter se of antitrust coconspirators
becomes one of speculation. The problems which must, or at least should
be resolved by a court faced with an action for contribution between
treble damage defendants, are: (1) what law to apply in determining
whether or not contribution may be had; and, (2) if it is not to be de-
rived from the law of any state, then what rule is to be adopted.
B. Applicable Law
It is clear, of course, that the choice lies between state law and
federal law. The federal law can exist as either federal common law,
irrespective of statute, or as that interstitial lawmaking so often involved
where federal statutes are concerned.
It might be concluded from the dicta in the Zell casec0 that state law
should apply. In fact, although the court there cited no authority, its
view that contribution would be available by virtue of the Maryland
statute appears, in effect, to be a precise application of the rule of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins.57 There the Supreme Court established the general
principle that federal courts in diversity cases may not, as to nonfederal
questions, disregard state law in matters of substantive rights.
If the court in Zell was unconsciously following the Erie rule, it
would necessarily arrive at the conclusion it did-that contribution
would be allowed by virtue of the Maryland law. The right of one
joint tort-feasor to recover contribution from another has been held to,
be a substantive, not a remedial right,s and is therefore governed, in
accordance with the recognized conflict of laws rule, by the law of the
place of the wrongs 9 The cause of action for treble damages arose in
Maryland and contribution would therefore be allowed under the
Maryland statute. Similarly, had the cause of action arisen in another
state, the Erie doctrine would require the court to search for and apply,
if ascertainable, the conflict rule of the forum for purposes of finding the
law governing the rights and liabilities of the parties0P
This presupposes, however, that the Eric doctrine is applicable and
55. As previously noted, the probable frequency with which treble damage codefendants
settle their respective obligations between themselves may explain this almost total lack of
authority.
56. 234 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1956).
57. 304 U.S. 64 (193S).
5S. Charnock v. Taylor, 223 N.C. 360, 26 S.E2d 911 (1943). See also 1 Moore, Federal
Practice f 0.6 [4] at 237 (2d ed. 1961).
59. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Hughes, 273 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1960); Toho Bussan Kaiba,
Ltd. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 265 F.2d 41S (2d Cir. 1959).
60. Stentor Elec. Mlfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 125 F.2d S20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
635 (1942).
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that state law would govern the question of contribution. But there is
another side to the coin, namely, that
insofar as Erie represents authority for the required application of state law by
federal courts, it is not controlling on problems implicated in the operation of a
-congressional program. . . . As to such questions, state law cannot govern of its
own force; there must be competence in the federal judiciary to declare the governing
law.61
Any doubts regarding this principle were laid to rest by the Supreme
Court in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States.2 This case involved an
intercepted Works Progress Administration check, cashed by the forger,
and endorsed over to the Clearfield Trust Company. The intended payee
notified the Government of nonreceipt twelve days later, but Clearfield
was not notified of the forgery for six weeks, and the Government did not
disclose its intention of seeking reimbursement for nearly six months.
Under Pennsylvania law, delay in notification constituted a complete de-
fense. There was no related congressional provision. In rejecting the
state rule, the Court stated that it agreed with the court of appeals that
the Erie rule did not apply to the action. Federal law rather than local
law governed the rights and duties of the United States on the commercial
paper it issued. The disbursement of funds or the payment of debts by
the United States is a constitutional function, and the authority to issue
the checks was in no way dependent on any state laws. Accordingly, "in
the absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to
fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards."0 3
Here the reasons making state law at times the appropriate federal rule
were inappropriate:
The application of state law, even without the conflict of laws rules of the forum,
would subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty.
It would lead to great diversity in results by making identical transactions subject
to the vagaries of the laws of the several States. The desirability of a uniform rule
is plain.64
Although the language of the opinion speaks directly only of the United
States, plaintiff in the action, the basic rationale underlying the decision
would seem equally apposite to any issue bearing a substantial relation
to an established function of the national government.0 6
61. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797, 799 (1937).
62. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
63. Id. at 367.
64. Ibid.
65. Cf. Mishkin, supra note 61, at 801-02 n.19: "The line of argument used in Clcarfield
is based upon the federal nature of the function involved, rather than upon the fact of the
Government being a party to the specific litigation. That this must be its rationale Is In-
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The independent judgment left to the federal courts by the Clcarfield
case may, of course, be exercised by adopting state law as governing, by
incorporating local rules of decision as the "federal law" for this pur-pose.66 Even the Clearfield opinion recognized this,6 but the Court pro-
ceeded to determine expressly that, in the situation before it, a single
nationwide substantive rule should be applied. There is no infallible test
by which the courts have been guided in this respect, but it may be said
generally, that state law is often chosen in the determination of federal
questions only because of a special difficulty in the judicial framing of a
definite federal rule on a specific issue in an area otherwise truly na-
tional."' Indeed, this may have been the unarticulated rationale under-
lying the dicta in the Zell case. As will be seen, however, the question of
contribution under the antitrust laws should not fall into this area of
special difficulty.
It has been stated that the Erie doctrine requires the federal courts to
follow state law in diversity cases, but has no application in actions
based on some other jurisdictional ground, for example, a federal ques-
tion.6 9 While this is true in the vast majority of cases, it is not a com-
pletely accurate statement of the law.70 The law to be applied is keyed to
dicated by (a) the fact that the Court did not rely at all on the grant of federal jurisdiction
over litigation brought by the United States ... (b) the impossibility of limiting any such
rule solely in terms of parties to the litigation . . . and (c) the Court's citation of an
earlier case [Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940)] in which a similar approach had
been used though the Government was not directly involved ....
66. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 5S0 (1956).
67. "In our choice of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally selected state law."
31S U.S. at 367.
6S. See ~ishkin, supra note 61, at S03. Even in cases involving federal matter state law
determines many questions which affect the ultimate decision: (1) because Congrezs has
not provided a rule; (2) because the federal law makes a reference to state law, as it often
does in bankruptcy; or, (3) because a particular matter, related to the question at bar, is
not strictly within the federal domain. See 1 loore, Federal Practice ff 0.6 [4] at 237 (2d
ed. 1961).
69. See, D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942). In nondivcrity cases,
federal courts are controlled by the law of the United States, not by state law regardless
of how persuasive it may be. Federal law does not change with the jurisdiction in order to
comply with the various procedural and substantive laws of the state. It is the implementa-
tion of the federal constitution and statutes, and is conditioned solely by them. Guided by
these standards, the federal courts are free to draw upon all sources of the common law
and to apply traditional techniques of decision in such cases. Id. at 471-72 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
70. At least one writer has seen Clearfield as a judicial attempt to avoid the expanson
of the Rules of Decision Act occasioned by the Erie decision. See Note, Clearfield: Clouded
Field of Federal Common Law, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 991 (1953). The same writer concludes
that "the present trend is to reduce the Act to an island of diversity, not by limiting its
scope but by broadly reading its exception." Id. at 1007. His conclusion is reinforced by
TMr. Justice Frankfurter's remarks in Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 651 (1953): "Its
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the nature of the issue before the court: if nonfederal, state substantive
law is applied; if a federal matter is before the court, federal law is to
be applied. These distinctions help to explain the discrepancy between
Mr. Justice Brandeis' statement in Erie that "there is no federal general
common law . .,"1 and the conclusion of a unanimous Supreme Court
ten years later that "there remains . . . an area of 'federal common
law' .... M2
Apart from the Zell and Goldlawr cases the question of contribution
between antitrust codefendants has not been before the federal courts,
even indirectly. As has been noted, the court in Zell may have been
following the Erie doctrine or may simply have selected Maryland law
in its exercise of the right of independent choice in federal matters. As
one of the only two judicial authorities in point, the dicta there would
undoubtedly be persuasive. On the other hand, the Goldlawr court leaned
towards federal law as controlling. Whether Zell or Goldlawr is correct
on this point depends largely upon the analogies that can be drawn from
other cases, in line with the principles outlined. It is submitted, however,
that the question of contribution between treble damage defendants is
not subject to the Erie doctrine.
In Deitrick v. Greaney,73 a national bank acquired shares of its own
stock in violation of the National Bank Act of 1864.74 To conceal the
acquisition, a director of the bank gave his personal note to be carried
on the books instead of the stock, on the understanding that it was not
to be paid. Upon insolvency of the bank, the receiver sued the director
on his note. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the de-
fenses of illegality and want of consideration were available. Further,
since the federal statute provided criminal sanctions, should the question
of civil liability be left to state law? The Court rejected state law, which
might have estopped the plaintiff, and held that recovery could be had as
a matter of federal law, saying:
A point much discussed in brief and argument, upon the assumption that local
law will guide our decision . . . is whether, by Massachusetts law respondent is
precluded from setting up the illegality of the transaction as a defense to his note.
But it is the federal statute which condemns as unlawful respondent's acts. The
extent and nature of the legal consequences of this condemnation, though left by
[the Court's] jurisdiction did not derive from diversity of citizenship; indeed there was
no such diversity. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . .is irrelevant."
71. 304 U.S. at 78.
72. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947). The statements become
less contradictory when it is noted that the Standard Oil Court preferred to describe the
"federal common law" as the "'law of independent federal judicial decision.'" Id. at 308.
See also Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
73. 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
74. Rev. Stat. § 5201 (1875), 12 U.S.C. § 83 (1958).
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the statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless to be derived from it and
the federal policy which it has adopted.. .. 75
If the rationale indicated by the foregoing language is somewhat insuf-
ficient to determine the question of antitrust contribution in favor of
federal law, there are other analogies that may be drawn upon in the
context of the antitrust laws themselves.
It is an established premise that, even where diversity of citizenship
exists, the jurisdiction of a federal court over an antitrust treble damage
action is not based on that diversity, but on the fact that the action arises
under a law of the United States.-, There is no obligation upon the court,
therefore, to follow the Erie rule as to incidental questions not specifically
covered by the antitrust statutes. These matters should be settled in
accordance with the principles outlined above. There are, of course,
no cases in which the question of contribution between antitrust codefend-
ants has been decided in this manner, although the Goldlawr case
is a tentative indication of its propriety-"' There are, however, a number
of decisions regarding the survival and assignability of treble damage
actions, in which the reasoning appears to be equally pertinent to the
question of contribution.
In Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants AssenTh the court
had to determine whether or not a cause of action for treble damages
under the Sherman Act survives the death of the person by or against
whom it might have been brought. Before holding that it does, the court
of appeals decided that the survival of a cause of action created by an
act of Congress depends on the substantive, not the procedural, aspects
of the case. Unless Congress intends it to survive, it will not survive by
reason of state law; therefore, survival of an action for damages created
by the Sherman Act is to be determined by statutory interpretation in
the light of the common law, and not by state survival statutes or de-
cisions. The court found Erie RIR. v. Tompkins 0 to have no applica-
tion, inasmuch as the question did not concern a state common-law
rule but "the interpretation of a federal statute and the consequences
which flow from it.' ' sO
75. 309 U.S. at 200-01.
76. See, e.g., Christian v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 7 F.2d 431 (El). Ky. 1925);
Wogan Bros. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 215 Fed. 273 (E.D. La. 1914).
77. It is submitted that the remarks of the court in Webster Motor Car Co. v. Zll Motor
Car Co., 234 F.2d at 619, cannot be taken as authoritative on this question. They were, in
the first place, dicta, and secondly, without any expressly reasoned basis. Furthermore, the
dicta in the Goldlawr case is diametrically opposed.
78. 128 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1942).
79. 304 U.S. 64 (193S).
80. 128 F.2d at 648. See also Mloore v. Backus, 73 F.2d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 295
U.S. 640 (1935); lomand v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 37 F. Supp. 649 (Wfl.
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It appears that the question of contribution between antitrust defen-
dants meets all the criteria necessary for the application of federal law.
If it is a question of substance for purposes of the Erie doctrine, then,
like the issue of survival, it must also be such a question for purposes
of either the Clearfield"l or the Deitrick2 rules. As with survival, it is
an issue relating to the "consequences which flow from" a federal statute.
Although it pertains to the rights of defendants rather than the remedies
of plaintiffs, there is nothing in the relevant cases to indicate that this
would preclude the application of federal law. On the contrary, both the
Clearfield and Deitrick cases were concerned with defenses available
to the respective defendants, the latter, in particular, being concerned with
the extent of liability. Since the rights of the defendants inter se have a
direct bearing on the measure of their individual liabilities, the existence
or nonexistence of such rights is, therefore, a question of "the extent and
nature of the legal consequences" of acts condemned by a federal
statute.
To contend that the Erie rule is applicable not only ignores pertinent
precedents in favor of federal law, but subjects the question of contribu-
tion to the myriad complexities involved in the ascertainment of the
appropriate state law-an inquiry which might often have to resolve (on
what must necessarily be a pragmatic rather than a logical basis), what
state law would apply in the case of a multistate conspiracy. In applying
federal law, the courts could do so either in the exercise of that inter-
stitial lawmaking function necessary to the interpretation of federal
statutes, as illustrated by Deitrick v. Greaney, or, if the question of con-
tribution is found to be beyond the legitimate scope of interpretation of
the antitrust statutes, by virtue of the right of independent federal de-
cision as exemplified by the Clearfield case.8 3
IV. DETERMINATION OF A RULE OF CONTRIBUTION
The problem remaining, of course, is that of determining what the
rule of common law, as found by a federal court, would be with respect to
contribution between antitrust conspirators. Is it the old English rule
against contribution supposedly established in Merryweather v. Nixan, 4
Okla. 1941) (treble damage action assignable and state common law not applicable); Call-
louet v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 250 Fed. 639, 640 (E.D. La. 1917), where the court said:
"The Sherman Law is silent as to the survival of the right of action. As there is no other
statute of the United States in point, whether the action survives or not must be deter-
mined by the principles of the common law, regardless of the law of Louisiana."
81. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
82. 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
83. Unless, of course, there is some special difficulty in framing a federal rule, this
question will be resolved in the following inquiry into the applicable rule of law.
84. 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
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and applied today by a majority of American jurisdictions without modify-
ig legislation? Or is it the modified English rule, excluding only inten-
tional tort-feasors, as applied in six states and the District of Columbia?"
Should the state contribution statutes and the Uniform Contribution
Among Tort-Feasors Act be considered?-" What bearing should ques-
tions of policy and uniformity have? Finally, if contribution is permissi-
ble, should it be limited to joint-judgment defendants? In the absence of
any controlling authority, surely all of these factors must be considered.
A. MZ1ajority Common-Law Rie
The immediate inclination of a court would probably be to seize upon
the rule against contribution as applied by the majority of states in the
absence of modifying legislation. The temptation would be strengthened
by the fact that the Supreme Court, at least in nonfederal question
cases, has followed the same rule. 7 Moreover, the reasoning of the court
might well be directed by an important Supreme Court decision, handed
down in the exercise of its maritime jurisdiction. In Halcyon Lines v.
Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,5 a contractor's employee, while
making repairs aboard a ship, was injured through the negligence of
both the shipowner and the contractor. The shipowner paid a $65,000
judgment rendered for the employee and claimed contribution from
the contractor. Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court refused
to extend to noncollision cases the admiralty doctrine of equal division
of damages between two vessels at fault,60 reasoning as follows:
In the absence of legislation, courts exercising a common-law jurisdiction have
generally held that they cannot on their oyn initiative create an enforceable right
of contribution as between joint tortfeasors. This judicial attitude has provoked
protest on the ground that it is inequitable to compel one tortfeasor to bear the
entire burden of a loss which has been caused in part by the negligence of someone
else. Others have defended the policy of common-law courts in refusing to fashion
rules of contribution. To some extent courts exercising jurisdiction in maritime
85. See Prosser, Torts 248 (2d ed. 1955); note 39 supra.
86. See notes 9-11 supra.
87. See notes 39 & 40 supra.
S8. 342 U.S. 232 (1952).
89. In the district court, the judge allowed the introduction of evidence tending to show
the relative degree of fault, but disallowed a jury verdict dividing the damages 75-255 in
favor of Halcyon. He entered judgment in accordance with his conclusion that there was a
general rule governing maritime torts whereby each tort-feasor must pay half the damages.
Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, S9 F. Supp. 765 (El). Pa. 1950), rev'd, 1S7 F.2d 403 (3d Cir.
1951), rev'd sub nom. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282
(1952). The court of appeals agreed that a right of contribution existed, 1S7 F.2d 403 (3d
Cir. 1951), but held that it could not exceed the amount Haenn, as an employer, would
have been compelled to pay under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compenation
Act, 44 Stat. 1424-46 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (195S).
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affairs have felt freer than common-law courts in fashioning rules, and we would feel
free to do so here if wholly convinced that it would best serve the ends of justice.
We have concluded that it would be unwise to attempt to fashion new judicial rules
of contribution and that the solution of this problem should await congressional
action.90
The reasoning of the Halcyon Court is not particularly convincing
and, in any event, should not be controlling. There is, of course, no
foundation in logic either for the proposition that the courts cannot create
an enforceable right, or for that schizophrenia of principle which estab-
lishes one rule for maritime and another for terrestrial torts. That the
judicial mind should feel more constrained in the exercise of non-
admiralty jurisdiction is an historical anomaly that no Holmesian aphorism
can explain away. Granting, however, that logic does not always prevail,
even in the interest of justice, the Halcyon Court's failure to face the
issue before it, was predicated almost entirely upon the premise that
the multitude of federal maritime statutes dealing with rights and liabili-
ties constituted a detailed statutory scheme of compensation requiring
legislative rather than judicial integration." This avenue of escape would
not appear to be available with respect to the antitrust statutes, since
the courts have already freely exercised that interstitial lawmaking func-
tion incidental to the enforcement of legislation which does not purport
to be comprehensive. 2 The "wait for Congress to act" argument has
been conspicuous by its absence in judicial consideration of rights and
liabilities arising under the antitrust laws.
Given then, that a court faced with the question should endeavor to
ascertain the correct rule of law without vacating. its function in favor
of Congress, the question arises whether the sources on which the court
is to draw permit the establishment of a federal rule of contribution in
antitrust damage actions.
The cases on survival and assignment provide a point of beginning."
90. 342 U.S. at 285. (Emphasis added.)
91. After giving most unjudicial consideration to the possibly conflicting interests of
the pressure groups (e.g., insurance companies) concerned with the administration of these
statutes, the Court concluded with the remarkable non sequitur that "because Congress
while acting in the field has stopped short of approving the rule of contribution here urged,
we think it would be inappropriate for us to do so." Id. at 287.
92. The cases already discussed dealing with the many questions left unresolved by the
antitrust statutes-e.g., nature of the cause of action, apportionment of judgments, assign-
ment, survival, and limitations-strongly indicate that antitrust is not a field in which
the courts are prone to await congressional action. For what they are worth, the dicta In
Webster Motor Car Co. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 234 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1956) and Goldlawr,
Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960) support anticipation of the same attitude
with respect to contribution.
93. Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1942);
[Vol. 31
1962] CONTRIBUTION IN ANTITRUST ACTIONS 131
In Momand v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp.,4 the court outlined
the application of the "general jurisprudence of the federal courts to
the question of assignability as follows:
Under the broad common law rule, causes of action for torts, or sounding in tort,
did not survive and were, therefore, not assignable. The maximum actio personalis
moritur cum persona .. originally applied to most every form of action, v;hether
arising out of contract or tort, but the common law Vwas modified by the Statute
of 4 Edward the III.
Under the interpretation of the common law, as modified by the Statute of 4
Edward the III, it has been generally held that a cause of action created by Section
7 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was assignable, on the theory that although the
action was for a wrongful act and therefore tortious, the acts declared to be unlawful
did not affect the person but the business or property of the assignor and it was,
therefore, not ex delicto and came within the exception of the general rule forbidding
the assignment of a thing in action, arising out of a tort. More accurately, this rule
is limited to torts in the nature of personal wrongs.00
Identical reasoning was followed in Moore v. Backus"r and the Barnes
CoalPs case with respect to the survival of a cause of action for treble
damages. Of course, it would be difficult to persuade any American court
that on the question of contribution it is bound to follow the English
common law, as modified by the Law Reform Act of 1935, O which
established rules of contribution between all joint tort-feasors. Nor
would such a task be lightened by the observation that neither the
common-law rule against contribution nor the modifying statute was
in existence at the time the English common law was adopted by the
American states. 00
This is not to say, however, that the historical evolution of the prin-
ciples and rules of contribution and their present application in both
England and the United States are not persuasive. The court in Barnes
pointed out that it had no doubt the cause of action survived when it
interpreted the statute creating the action in light of the common law.
The court stated that this kind of question should involve consideration
Moore v. Backus, 7S F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1935); Momand v. Twentleth-Century Fo Film
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Okla. 1941).
94. 37 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Okla. 1941).
95. Moore v. Backus, 73 F.2d at 575.
96. 37 F. Supp. at 651-52.
97. 73 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1935).
9S. 128 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1942).
99. Law Reform (Married Women and Tort-feasors) Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 30,
§ 6 provides in part: "(1) Where damage is suffered by any person as a result of a tort
(whether a crime or not) ... (c) any tort-feasor liable in respect of that damage may
recover contribution from any other tort-feasor who is, or would if sued have ben, liable
in respect of the same damage, whether as a joint tort-feasor or otherwise... !
10D. The leading case of Merryweather v. Nixan, S Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337
(K.B. 1799), was decided some years after the American Revolution.
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not merely of ancient decisions and the state of the common law at the
time of the American Revolution, but subsequent developments and
rulings interpreting that law. In arriving at its decision in favor of
survival, the court concluded that
to say that the courts of this country are forever bound to perpetuate such of its
rules as, by every reasonable test, are found to be neither wise nor just, because
we have once adopted them as suited to our situation . . . at a particular time, is to
deny to the common law . . . [its] "flexibility and capacity for growth and adapta-
tion. . ."101
B. The Minority Common-Law Rule and the Intentional Tort
The correct rule with respect to contribution, as applied in English
and early American decisions, limited its denial to cases of willful and
conscious wrongdoing.102 That this is still the law in seven, and possibly
eight jurisdictions103 goes far to negate the argument that the common-
law courts are somehow incapable of fashioning rules of contribution.
The courts of Louisiana,'04 Minnesota, 05 Pennsylvania, 00 Tennessee, 0 1
Wisconsin,'08 and the District of Columbia'" have encountered little
difficulty in permitting one negligent defendant to recover contribution
from his cotort-feasor, even in the absence of statute. As the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has pointed out:
We are not determining that contributionship always exists between joint tort-
feasors; we are deciding only that, in this particular instance, if that be the result,
we do not look upon it as one that is improper, or unjust, or without sanction in
law. There may be cases in which such outcome should not be sanctioned; they will
be disposed of in the future when they are brought before us for determination,."
The fact that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has found itself
able to master the complexities of judicially created contribution"'
101. 128 F.2d at 649.
102. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799); Bailey
v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455 (1859); Nickerson v. Wheeler, 118 Mass. 295 (1875).
103. See note 8 supra and notes 104-109 infra.
104. Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933).
105. Duluth, M. & N. Ry. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 236 N.W. 766 (1931).
106. Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 AtI. 231 (1928).
107. Davis v. Broad St. Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950).
108. Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis. 591, 195 N.W. 855 (1923).
109. Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
110. Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 365-66, 141 Atl. 231, 235 (1928).
111. Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1949), citing George's Radio, Inc. v.
Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1942). "' [W]e adopt for the District of
Columbia the rule that when the parties are not intentional and wilful wrongdoers, but
are made so by legal inference or intendment, contribution may be enforced.'" Knell adopted
this rule for the District of Columbia, "without exception or reservation .... "1 174 F.2d at 666.
The rule was first established in Herr v. Barber, 2 Mackey 545 (Sup. Ct. D.C. 1883). The
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should carry additional weight in favor of its application to cases arising
under a federal statute.
There is, of course, the counterargument that, even assuming the
validity of the minority rule, its operation is limited to nonintentional
wrongs, occasionally even to mere passive negligence, so that it would
not extend to the deliberate violation of the antitrust laws."l This may
be true in the case of knowing individual violators, but is a corporation
violating the law through the acts of employees, other than corporate
officers, guilty of more than unintentional wrongdoing? Surely the wrong
in such a case consists in neglect to exercise due control over the actions
of subordinates rather than in any willful infliction of injury by the
corporation acting through its principal officers. Whatever the reasons
for the rule of criminal and civil corporate liability in antitrust cases,
such corporate responsibility arises, not from an imputation of intent,
but by virtue of an extension of the doctrine of respondeat superior,
and the corporation would in all probability be entitled to indemnity
from the employees concerned." 3 Since a finding of corporate negligence
is one often made by the courts in such cases to impose liability for
the illegal acts involved, n4 it would not seem unwarranted for the same
factor to operate in favor of a defendant corporation for the purposes of
contribution.
A recent case, Uvited States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.," appears
to lend at least indirect support to this thesis. One of the Government's
contentions against several affiliated corporations was that a vice-presi-
dent of Jerrold's subsidiary, Jerrold Northwest, had conducted a cam-
paign to force customers to purchase Jerrold equipment, thereby indicat-
ing an intent on the part of all the defendants to achieve a monopoly
in the field. In refusing to impute this intent so as to impose liability
Knell court emphasized the misinterpretation of Mferryweather v. Nixan as "due to the
brevity of the report and a misleading headnote . . ." and said, "in formulating a definite
contribution rule, we desire to use the utmost care and to reexamine meticulously the
general subject of contribution." 174 F.2d at 666.
112. See Linkenhoger v. Owens, 131 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1950).
113. The right of indemnity exists at common law, being based in contract, on a
representation or warranty by the employee of care and skiU in the duties for which he is
hired. See Harmer v. Cornelius, 5 C.B. (n-s.) 236, 141 Eng. Rep. 94 (135S) (leading case);
Lister -. Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co., [1957] A.C. 555. Its enforcement is of
course limited by practical considerations, but there seems to be no reason to preclude its
application to cases of knowing violations of the law. See Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co, 179 Misc. 202, 33 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47
N.V.S.2d 5S9 (1st Dep't 1944).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Armour & Co., 16S F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 194S); CIT Corp.
v. United States, 150 F.2d S5 (9th Cir. 1945); Zito v. United States, 64 F.2d 772 (7th Cir.
1933).
115. 137 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), rehearing denied, 365 U.S 567 (1051) (per curiam).
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on all corporate defendants, the court stated that, since the vice-president
must have intended the natural consequences of his actions, and since he
was acting as an officer of Jerrold Northwest, his intent could be at-
fributed to that corporation. However, this intent could not be imputed
to Jerrold, because, although "Jerrold Northwest was an agent of Jerrold
and the latter was responsible for its wrongs under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, the agent's intent is not imputed to its principal."110
While the language of the court is not entirely clear, it seems to contain
the implication that, whatever the criminal and civil liability of a corpora-
tion for the intentional acts of its employees under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, wrongful intent is not to be imputed under that
doctrine unless the action is taken by a corporate officer.
C. The Modifying Statutes and the Intentional Tort
Suppose a court does not adopt the minority common-law rule or
finds that intentional wrongdoing should nevertheless be imputed to in-
dividual and corporate defendants alike. Would it then be free to adopt
the negative rule prevailing in the majority of states which have not
passed modifying legislation? It is submitted that it would not because
the common law of the states, individually or collectively, is not the
only source of general common law for the federal courts.
In Whitin Mach. Works v. United States,"' the Government brought
an action for breach of implied warranty under a contract of manufacture
and sale by the defendant of certain generator sets. In determining the
applicable law, and its scope, the court reasoned that, in the absence of
a controlling act of Congress, the law to be applied in cases involving
rights and liabilities under a contract with the United States may be a
"general federal common law of sales" rather than the law of a particu-
lar state. Such a common law would not imply warranties more extensive
than those spelled out in the Uniform Sales Act." 8 Similarly, in another
case Judge Learned Hand had occasion to decide "whether the [Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act] is 'federal', as well as state, law . . .,too
with respect to its application to the rights and liabilities of a federal
agency. In holding that the federal law should apply, in accordance with
Deitrick v. Greaney,'120 D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,12 1 and United
States v. Standard Oil Co.,122 the court stated that government corpora-
116. Id. at 569.
117. 175 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1949).
118. Id. at 507.
119. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. v. RFC, 180 F.2d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 1950).
120. 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
121. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
122. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
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tions, national in their scope, are not subject to state law, and should not
be forced to shape their transactions to conform to the varying state laws
where they occur or are to be carried out. Deciding the issue in favor of
uniformity, Judge Hand pointed out that
the Negotiable Instruments Law has been enacted in every state of the Union, as well
as the District of Columbia; it is a source of "federal law--however that phrase
may be construed-more complete and more certain than any other which can con-
ceivably be drawn from those sources of "general law" to which we were accustomed to
resort in the days of Swift v. Tyson 2 a3
The Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act has not, of course,
been enacted in every state of the Union. However, its adoption in nine
jurisdictions, together with the existence of similar legislation in fourteen
others and the minority rule of judicial contribution in at least seven
more, should surely provide a more compelling source of federal common
law than the misconceived and vigorously denounced rule against con-
tribution'2 which prevails in the remainder of the states. It is true that
the common-law contribution jurisdictions deny contribution in cases of
intentional torts, and the revised Uniform Act does so in cases of willful
or wanton torts.' 25 As noted previously, however, this limitation ignores
the principle that damages in tort are, broadly speaking compensatory
rather than punitive. Even James, who does not appear to be wholly in
favor of contribution, questions the desirability of thus restricting the
right once it is recognized. -6 As another writer has pointed out:
Despite the literal interpretation of a "wrongdoer", to apply [the rule against con-
tribution] ... to the case of joint tort-feasors works an injustice. Most joint and
several tort liability results from inadvertently caused damage, although it is almost
impossible to draw a practical line between torts of inadvertence and others. It is
ironic to note that at common law contribution is denied among all tort-feasors, yet it
is allowed as a matter of course to one who has deliberately chosen to violate a con-
tractual obligation undertaken with others. r7
Moreover, the revised Uniform Act has been adopted by only one state,
North Dakota,"s while the 1939 Uniform Actl1  and most other contribu-
123. 1S0 F.2d at 244.
124. For an example of vigorous denunciation, see Prosser, Torts 243 (2d ed. 1955).
Prosser points out that "the only kind word said by any writer for the rule denying contri-
bution is in James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, [54 Harv.
L. Rev. 1156 (1941)] contending that there should be no contribution in favor of an insured
tortfeasor." Id. at 248 n.65.
125. See Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 230 (1957).
126. 1 Harper & James, Torts 720-21 (1956).
127. Silver, Aspects of the Right of Contribution Among Tort-Feasors, 33 Temp. L.Q.
432 (1960).
123. ND. Cent. Code § 32-33-01 (1960).
129. Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 233 (1957).
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don statutes including the English, 130 make no distinction between in-
tentional and inadvertent torts.
D. The Case for Contribution
The desirability of uniformity in the antitrust field, while an effective
argument to preclude the application of state law, 3' would have a limited
effect in supporting a federal rule of contribution, since uniformity
is achieved whether or not contribution is allowed under federal law.
However, it would seem reasonable to point out that the federal rule
should be with, and not against, the clear trend in favor of contribu-
tion.132 In facing the question of contribution in antitrust damage ac-
tions, the courts will not be attempting to divine the intent of Congress,
since it is clear that Congress never adverted to the matter. Accordingly,
those sources of federal common law on which they should draw ought
130. Law Reform (Married Women and Tort-feasors) Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 30,
§ 6.
131. See Moore v. Backus, 78 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1935). "The [Sherman] Act Is quite
general in its nature, and its successful enforcement would seem to require a uniform In.
terpretation in its application . . . ." Id. at 575.
132. The intricacies of the question of contribution in the federal versus state law
context are further compounded by a consideration of the question under other federal
statutes. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958), expressly provides for the
application of the law of the place of the tort. It would at best, therefore, afford an
extremely remote inference that state law, as a matter of policy, should apply where federal
statutes are silent. The Jones Act, 41 Stat. 988 (1920) (codified in scattered sections of 46
U.S.C.), on the other hand, has been held to require the application of federal law, Halcyon
Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952). However, this Instance
of denial of contribution as a matter of federal law can be readily distinguished on the
basis that the Court felt bound not to interfere with what it regarded as a detailed statutory
scheme of compensation, a consideration which has no place in the interpretation of broad,
general statutes such as the antitrust laws. Most confusing of all is the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 34 Stat. 232 (1906) (codified in scattered sections of 45 U.S.C.). While claims
thereunder have been held to be governed by federal law, Woodington v. Pa. R.R., 236
F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1956), it has also been decided, without explanation, that contribution
between defendants is governed by state law. Zontelli Bros. v. Northern Pac. R.R., 263 F.2d
194 (8th Cir. 1959) ; Fort Worth & Denver Ry. v. Threadgill, 228 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1955).
Again, however, it can be pointed out that the FELA is concerned not so much with the
creation of new rights of action and with national policy, but with providing injured
plaintiffs with convenient forums and procedures. The question of contribution under
FELA, therefore, is less of a bona fide federal question than one which state law, common
or statutory, should more appropriately be left to handle as in the case of the typical
common-law tort. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the factor of insurance
is involved in FELA and Jones Act claims, while insurance against antitrust violation
liability would not only be impractical in terms of cost but probably against public policy.
It is submitted, therefore, that while these statutes and the decisions under them might be
cited both for and against the application of state or federal law and the existence of con-
tribution, the difference in the objectives involved is such as to preclude their having sig-
nificance as reliable guides to a correct resolution of the question of antitrust contribution.
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to compel the conclusion that the right of contribution exists. On the
other hand, for the courts to fall back on the well-worn and fallacious
argument that the fashioning of rules of contribution is beyond judicial
capability would involve not only a vacating of their function, but the
imputation of an intention on the part of Congress to deny contribution.
If, therefore, the courts feel that, because of the very lack of an indication
of congressional intent the choice is not one they can fairly make, they
should at least treat the question as one of those involving special dif-
ficulty and take state law as the federal rule for purposes of contribution.
This would still be shifting the responsibility to Congress, with much less
justification than, for example, in the case of the antitrust limitation
period. Such a compromise would, however, avoid closing the judicial
door against contribution, an action for which there would be little
sanction in law or logic, and still leave the states free to assist in a
solution to the question.'33
There remains the implication in the Flintkote opinion'3 that the
deterrent aspects of the antitrust laws are enhanced by an unrestricted
principle of joint and several liability. Combined with the consideration
that treble damages are punitive as well as compensatory in nature, this
appears to militate strongly against dilution of the penalties through
contribution. These arguments lose much of their force, however, in the
face of the realization that the absence of contribution can operate to
the advantage of equally guilty conspirators by permitting them to go
"scot-free." 'What the punitive burden loses in terms of the risk of its
concentration on a few larger coconspirators, it would certainly gain
through diffusion over a larger number of violators. Not only would
the existence of rights of contribution remove to a great extent the pos-
sibility of escaping liability entirely, making it less attractive for smaller
companies, particularly, to join in any concerted violation, but it would,
in a sense, add vigor to the enforcement of the antritrust laws by allowing
the conspirators themselves to ensure that all those participating in the
unlawful action are appropriately penalized.
Therefore, it is concluded that while the initial inclination of the courts
may be to follow the so-called rule against contribution, there are sound
bases for effective persuasion in favor of a right of contribution between
antitrust coconspirators.
133. "[A] decision that a given matter is governed by federal law operates to preclude
both state courts and state legislation from contributing to a solution of the problems
involved. If the federal courts woodenly shift the responsibility to Congresz, the con-
sequence is that creative development by the judicial process is wholly prevented in the
area in question." Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 703 (1953).
See also Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln AMill, 353 U.S. 443, 456-57 (1957)
for an analysis of federal judicial responsibility in such cases.
134. Flinthote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 36S (9th Cir. 1957).
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E. Defects of the Joint-Judgment Rule
Six states which now have contribution statutes have expressly limited
the right to joint-judgment defendants.3'8 The undesirability of this con-
dition precedent is well demonstrated by James, who describes it as an((unnecessary limitation":
When one defendant has no right against a co-defendant until a joint judgment has
been rendered against them both, the decision of the plaintiff whether or not there
will be a joint judgment and who will be included therein also determines what right,
if any, there will be to contribution. This permits the plaintiff to make his own
selection and, insofar as he exercises it, the policy of the statute may be defeated.
The reasons for allowing contribution, however, apply as strongly to those cases in
which the plaintiff sues only one tort-feasor as to those in which there is a joint
judgment.' 36
The joint-judgment rule is a statutory anomaly without rational founda-
tion. Moreover, the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act ex-
pressly avoids the limitation. 13 T It is submitted, therefore, that, in framing
a federal rule of contribution, the courts should not subject it to any
such restriction, but leave tort-feasors who are willing to assume the
greater burden of proof necessary for judgment against those not sued
by the plaintiff, free to do so.
F. Basis of Contribution
Since only three states have retained the optional provision 138 of the
1939 Uniform Act for distribution according to degrees of fault where
equal distribution would be inequitable, 8 ' and since the courts do not
appear to have taken any steps on their own initiative toward implement-
ing this notion, it would be unlikely to find application in an antitrust
case of first impression. In addition, a court would be faced with an
almost impossible task in trying to ascertain a basis for assigning relative
degrees of fault. While undoubtedly a suitable device in the joint negli-
gence case, such a test is not necessarily satisfactory for antitrust torts.
Arbitrary tests such as total sales values or profits derived might have
little relation to the extent of participation or corporate negligence in-
volved. By the same token, estimated degrees of guilt or fault, even if
the antitrust laws lent themselves to such a concept, might not cor-
respond at all with the illegal benefits derived which, after all, reflect
135. See note 10 supra. They are Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, Texas, and
West Virginia.
136. 1 Harper & James, Torts 720 (1956).
137. Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 233 (1957).
138. Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 235 (1957).
139. See Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 237
(1957) (Supp. 1961).
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the damage inflicted upon the plaintiff. The argument can, of course, be
made, but there is little authoritative support for contribution on a rela-
tive basis.
Assuming that contribution, if allowed at all, would be limited to
recovery of the excess paid by any joint tort-feasor over his pro rata
share of the common liability (as most of the state statutes now provide),
there remains the question of the effect of insolvency of some of the
joint defendants. Since the question of contribution itself, as a matter
of substantive federal law, has not been decided, there is of course no
federal rule with respect to insolvency. However, in two related opinions,
the New Jersey Supreme Court has considered this problem and has
attempted to fill the interstices of the New Jersey statute.1"4 0 In Judson v.
Peoples Bazk & Trust Co.,141 the plaintiffs charged that they had been
induced by fraud to sell their shares of stock in a New Jersey corpora-
tion and sought recovery of the difference between the price received
and the actual value of the shares. The court found four tort-feasors
jointly liable but by the conclusion of the second trial, two had settled
for small amounts and a third had become insolvent.
The first Judsoel- case established the rule that determination of a
pro rata share is made by dividing the number of available tort-feasors
within the jurisdiction into the amount of the verdict received by the
plaintiff in his suit against any one of them. In a dictum, the court an-
nounced the standard equity rule that the number of pro rata shares is
to be determined on the basis of the number of tort-feasors commonly
liable who are available and solvent. However, in the second case the
court, faced with two settlements for less than the respective pro rata
shares, concluded that the plaintiff could collect both remaining shares
from the solvent tort-feasor. It reasoned that the plaintiff should not suf-
fer a further loss because of one tort-feasor's insolvency, where plaintiff
neither knew of it at the time of the settlement nor meant to prejudice a
remaining defendant.'43 Hence, the insolvent's share was included in
determining the total number of shares, and the solvent defendant could
attempt to recover contribution only from the insolvent, since the remain-
ing two had settled.
This latter rule, however, would seem to be limited in application to
cases in which some pro rata shares have been compromised by settle-
ment. Where no settlements have been made, the clear intimation is
that the equity rule of the first Jvdson case would apply and the pro
rata shares be determined by dividing the damages between available
140. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-3 (1952).
141. 25 NJ. 17, 134 A.2d 761 (1957).
142. 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954).
143. 25 N.J. at 38, 134 A.2d at 772.
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and solvent defendants. If contribution is allowed, therefore, the pro
rata shares would most probably be calculated on the above basis. A
court would hardly be likely to let a plaintiff lose any part of the recovery
to which he might be entitled because of such a fortuitous circumstance
as the insolvency of one or more of the joint defendants.
V. CONCLUSION
On balance, therefore, it seems that, despite the indisputable and
highly practical deterrent objective of the treble damage provision, both
logic and the law compel the conclusion that one of several coconspira-
tors should not be called upon to shoulder the entire damage burden
while his more fortunate fellows, who may not even have been joined
in the action, go "scot-free." The availability of contribution on a pro rata
basis would not only be equitable as among the conspirators, but should
insure a fuller enforcement of the antitrust laws without appreciably
lessening the punitive effect of treble damage liability.
